Implicit self-comparisons against others could bias quality of life assessments by Fayers, Peter et al.
This article was originally published in the 
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 2007;60:1034-1039 and is available from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science//journal/08954356 
 
 
Implicit self-comparisons against others can bias quality of life 
assessments. 
Peter M Fayers1,2, Anne L Langston3,4, Clare Robertson3, on behalf of the 
PRISM trial 
group 
1Department of Public Health, Institute of Applied Health Sciences, University of 
Aberdeen, UK 
2Pain and Palliation Research Group, Faculty of Medicine, Norwegian University of 
Science and 
Technology, Trondheim, Norway 
3Health Services Research Unit, Institute of Applied Health Sciences, University of 
Aberdeen, UK 
4Queen's Medical Research Institute, University of Edinburgh 
Correspondence to: 
Prof P M Fayers, Department of Public Health, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 
2TN, UK 
p.fayers@abdn.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 1224 559 573 
 
Abstract 
Objectives: 
To explore how patient-reported health related quality of life (HRQL) and global health 
status are 
affected by use of differing personal reference frames. We hypothesised that implicit 
comparisons against 
self at an earlier time, against healthy peers or against ill patients would greatly affect 
patients’ response 
values. 
Study design and setting: 
Patients in a randomised trial for treatment of Paget’s disease completed annual HRQL 
questionnaires. 
Supplementary questions were appended, asking the patients whether they were aware of 
having made 
implicit comparisons. 
Results: 
The majority of patients reported considering themselves a year ago (31% at baseline), 
themselves before 
becoming ill (23%) or other healthy people (24%), with similar proportions during follow 
up. Mean 
HRQL scores varied substantially according to the declared frame of reference, with 
differences as big as 
19% of the scale score, or a standardised mean effect size of 0.74 standard deviations. 
Conclusion: 
Reported reference frames were associated with effects of similar magnitude to the 
differences in HRQL 
that are regarded as clinically important. This may be of particular concern in trials that 
randomise 
patients to management in different settings, such as treatment at home / in hospital, or 
surgery / 
chemotherapy, and might bias or obscure HRQL differences. 
 
Introduction 
Patient-completed global questions about “overall health” and “overall quality of life” 
(health-related quality of life, HRQL) have been reported to be important prognostic 
indicators in advanced cancer, and are good predictors of survival [1,2], and similar 
results have been observed both for HRQL and for self-rated health in many other serious 
illnesses [3, 4]. Furthermore, as Fayers and Sprangers noted [5], these results are 
curiously robust across a wide range of seemingly vague and non-specific questions. Thus 
it is not at all clear what patients have in mind when they respond to such questions as 
“What is your overall quality of life during the past week?” Indeed, this seemingly simple 
question begs the query: “Compared to what?” Fayers and Sprangers speculated that 
patients might employ different frames of reference, resulting in responses that are 
derived from implicit comparisons with various peer groups or against themselves at 
some previous time. Comparison groups that patients may have in mind include: healthy 
people, such as friends or family; other patients (“Compared to all those other very ill 
patients I see at the clinic, I’m doing very well”); themselves prior to their illness; or 
themselves at some other previous time such as a year or more ago.  The aims of this 
study were to explore whether patients use identifiable frames of reference, and the 
impact these might have on responses to questions about well-being or quality of life. We 
hypothesised that most patients would consciously have in mind one (or more) reference 
frames, and that these could be elicited by questioning.  Identifying these implicit 
comparisons is important because the response levels are likely to be affected by the 
particular comparisons used by each patient. We postulated that ill patients who are 
comparing themselves against a peer group comprising healthy friends would report a 
relatively poor HRQL, and that those who use other patients as their reference frame 
would report a better HRQL. 
 
Methods 
Patients 
A convenience sample was obtained from the ongoing PRISM randomised clinical trial of 
intensive versussymptomatic management for patients with Paget’s disease (ISRCTN 
12989577). Patients were already completing annually the SF36, the EuroQoL EQ5D, 
and the HAQ questionnaires. For our supplementary study, three additional questions 
were inserted after the SF36 questionnaire. As this was an opportunistic study, some trial 
patients had been recruited before the additional items were included. The trial recruited 
1325 eligible patients, of whom 976 completed the additional items at baseline (pre-
randomisation), 1076 at one year, and 967 at two years.  Severity of illness was assessed 
as time since the initial diagnosis, the number of bones involved, the level of deformity, 
and the number of fractures. 
 
Questionnaires 
The SF36 asks about “health in general” and offers response options from 1 = excellent to 
5 = poor. We appended at the end of the SF36 an equivalent item, with the same response 
options: “How would you rate your overall quality of life during the past week?” Patients 
were then given an open-response question: “We realise that different people have 
different things in mind when they answer questions about their ‘quality of life’. What 
things were you thinking about when you assessed your quality of life?” Finally they 
were asked: “When you rated your overall quality of life, were you mainly comparing 
yourself against one or more of the following?” with options that included: “before you 
became ill”, “how you felt a year ago”, “other people with Paget’s disease”, “ healthy 
people that you know (such as family or friends)” and “something else (please specify)”. 
Patients could tick one or more response option s. The use of these additional questions 
was approved by the multicentre and local research ethics 
committees. 
 
Statistical analysis 
Patients were assigned to groups according to their self-reported reference frame. One-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test for differences between the groups. 
Effects were compared visually and plotted with 95% confidence intervals. The study 
sample size had been determined for the main clinical trials outcomes, and was easily 
large enough for this exploratory quality of life substudy. p-values are uncorrected for 
multiplicity of testing, and therefore interpreted conservatively. Regression modelling 
was used to explore potential explanatory factors (age, gender, age at diagnosis, and 
disease severity as measured by bone deformity and bone pain, and HAQ scores). 
Patterns of change over time were explored by considering the transition matrices: for 
example, 26 patients reported using healthy peers at baseline and self before ill at one 
year, with mean change in HRQL of 0.27, while 22 changed in the corresponding reverse 
direction with a mean change also of 0.27. Generalized estimating equations 5 
(GEE), which can allow for correlations between successive ratings, were also used to 
explore patterns of change over the three time points. 
Results 
The mean age of the patients was 74 (range 37 to 94) and 53% were male. Approximately 
14% were recruited within the first year after diagnosis, and 50% were within five years 
of diagnosis.  Table 1 shows the distribution of the responses to the reference frame 
question, and the corresponding mean quality of life scores. At all time points, about 20% 
of patients said they had in mind how they were before they became ill, nearly a third 
were considering themselves a year or more previously, and about 20% were comparing 
themselves with healthy peers. There was also a gradual increase over time in the number 
of patients saying they were thinking of multiple references, reaching 19% by two years.  
Mean quality of life scores are also shown in Table 1. There were highly significant 
differences at all time points (ANOVA, p<0.0001). At each occasion the ranking of the 
main three groups was the same, and the differences between “before ill” and “healthy 
peers” were statistically highly significant (all with p<0.0001, pairwise t-tests). Figure 1 
shows the means at one year, with 95% confidence intervals. The relationship between 
time since diagnosis and the reference frame was also explored graphically and by 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was no visible association between diagnosis time 
and frame of reference at either baseline or later (p=0.2, 0.7, 0.05 respectively). Similarly, 
there was no suggestion of a relationship between reference frame and the severity of 
illness as measured by the number of bones involved, deformity or the number of 
fractures. Since the scale ranges from 1=excellent to 5=poor, the full range is 4.0. The 
observed 0.75 difference between the “before ill” and “healthy peers” groups ratings at 
baseline corresponds to a 19% overall change in values. Differences at later times were 
similar (18%, 21%). The standard deviation was 1.02, giving a standardised mean effect 
size of 0.74 standard deviations. The self-rated health item of the SF36 showed closely 
similar but slightly smaller patterns (data not presented), with mean differences of 16%, 
14% and 17% at the three time points. 6 
Although the exact date of diagnosis was not recorded, the age in years at diagnosis was 
known, and from this it was estimated that 119 patients had been diagnosed in the last 
year. These recent-diagnosis patients had less severe disease, and reported better quality 
of life. In this subset of patients it might be anticipated that there would be little 
distinction between “before ill” and “one year ago”. There were 42 patients who reported 
using themselves a year ago as the reference, while for 22 it was themselves before 
becoming ill. In these two groups the mean quality of life scores were equal (2.91, 2.90), 
offering a degree of validation reassurance. Potential predictive factors, as described 
under methods, were explored using regression modelling and analyses of covariance, but 
no factors were identified as explaining either the choice of reference frame or the 
differences in mean HRQL scores shown in Table 1. These negative analyses are not 
presented here. Of the 804 patients who completed both baseline and one-year 
questionnaires, only 265 (33%) reported using the same reference frame on both 
occasions. The changes appeared to be random – for example, equal numbers of patients 
went from “before ill” to “healthy peers” as in the opposite direction, and similarly for 
other transitions roughly equal numbers went in each direction between each pair of time 
points. This is also reflected in the constancy of the marginal percentages at each 
occasion, as shown in Table 1. Regression modelling and generalized estimating 
equations were applied to the mean HRQL scores and also to the change-scores, but no 
consistent patterns of change were detected. Although the overall sample size is large, 
there are 7 states (reference frames) in Table 1 and thus 49 possible transition states – 
with relatively few patients in many of the cells. 
 
Discussion 
The hypotheses that motivated this study were substantiated by the observed results. At 
baseline, almost a quarter of the patients reported comparing themselves against before 
they were ill, in contrast to another quarter comparing themselves to healthy peers, and 
nearly a third said themselves a year ago; similar proportions were observed at all time 
points. As might be anticipated, these groups of patients returned markedly different 
responses for their quality of life scores and for their self-rated general health, 
corresponding to a large effect size of 0.74 standard deviations, or 19% on a 100-point 
scale. Many HRQL instruments standardise their scales to range from 0 to 100, and a 
difference or a change of 10 units (10%) is commonly regarded as being a large and 
clinically significant effect. On that basis, the differences that we observed were 
extremely large, and are far greater than the impacts on HRQL that are commonly 
observed in clinical trials. The differences observed for the self-rated health item of the 
SF36 showed closely similar but slightly smaller patterns; this may be a reflection of 
having asked patients about their reference frames for rating their overall quality of life, 
or it may reflect the more personal interpretation of HRQL as opposed to self-rated 
health. Although few patients reported using the reference frame of other patients with 
Paget’s disease (24 at baseline, 41 at 1 year), the HRQL values of those that did were 
consistent with our predictions in showing the most favourable mean scores.  
 
The results accorded with our prior hypotheses that HRQL response patterns would be 
strongly affected by choice of comparator group. We contend that this implies responses 
do not consistently reflect the underlying HRQL, but vary according to whatever is in 
mind at the time of answering the questionnaire. However, a plausible alternative 
suggestion might be that the adaptation process leads patients to identify with a more 
realistic reference, namely other ill patients. We observed no evidence of consistent 
patterns of adaptation over time. To the contrary, only a third of the patients cited the 
same reference frames at successive assessments and only 13% reported the same 
reference on all three occasions. These changes appeared to be random. However, we 
have launched a qualitative study to interview patients about their thoughts, using 
cognitive interviewing techniques [6]. This study will also be used to test our assumption 
that reference frames can be elicited by questioning.  
 
The thought processes involved in responding to HRQL questionnaires are complex and 
the information utilised by the participant may be objective (such as presence/absence of 
a confirmed medical condition) and subjective [3]. Subjective information is derived from 
the respondent’s internal knowledge and past experience, thus producing a highly 
personal reference frame when rating quality of life scores. Respondents’ ratings may be 
dependent on life experiences and contact with other people [7].  
 
There has been limited research into the cognitive strategies adopted when patients with 
illness are asked to rate their (health related) quality of life. A number of small-sized 
qualitative studies have shown that different patients employ different reference frames, 
and authors have speculated about the consequences. We are not aware of other 
publications that have quantified the consequent effects. For example, Duggan and 
Dijkers [8] in a qualitative study of 40 patients with spinal cord injury noted that some 
with medium to low HRQL refused to compare themselves with others. One suggestion 
was that patients can enhance their own well-being by comparing themselves to less 
fortunate others. This “downward comparison” principle has long been recognised in 
psychology (e.g. Wills [9]; Van der Zee et al. [10]), but has not been evaluated and 
quantified for clinical HRQL scales. An editorial by Buunk et al. [11] provides a useful 
review of social comparison processes, including the effect of perceived norms, upward 
and downward comparison processes, and the role of cognitive biases such as unrealistic 
optimism. The disability paradox, in which patients typically report greater happiness and 
HRQL than do healthy people under similar circumstances, has been widely recognised 
and it has been suggested that this may be attributable to a combination of downward 
comparisons and response biases [12].  
 
Social scientists working in survey research have studied the implicit use of reference 
frames when assessing health status. However, in a population survey context, the 
concern has been to remove inherent ambiguities by directing respondents to use age-
standardised comparisons. Investigators have used questions such as “Compared to others 
of your age, how would you rate your health status?”, commonly specifying relative 
response options (better/worse) and not absolute values (such as very bad to very good) 
[3,13–18]. Better average health status is reported by the elderly when an age-comparison 
is explicitly invoked, and studies [16,17] have also found that age-related comparisons are 
better predictors of survival outcome. Ubel et al. [18] explored whether people of 
different ages interpret “perfect health” in different ways, and concluded that some people 
recalibrate their responses according to their age. These general population studies 
confined their investigations to age-related comparisons of health status. HRQL 
assessment in ill patients has not been investigated to the same extent as in population 
surveys, although we contend that the comparison issues may be even more serious if, as 
we observed, some patients enlist a reference group of healthy peers while others use sick 
patients.  
 
Our study was not without limitations. Patients with Paget’s disease are very different 
from those with cancer or other more common chronic diseases. The mean age was 74, 
and 19% were over 80. Some who ticked the box “healthy people that you know, such as 
friends or family” qualified their answer with a note that, given their age, they didn’t have 
any healthy friends and that their immediate family were ill or dead. Another 
unanticipated problem was patients commented that they did not know and had never 
seen anyone else with Paget’s. In oncology, for example, we would expect that the 
majority would meet or already know others with cancer, and that therefore a number of 
patients could be making comparison against others with cancer. We are, therefore, 
repeating this study in a bladder cancer clinical trial and in a study of breast cancer. It is 
hoped that these studies, together with the cognitive interviewing study mentioned above, 
will confirm and substantiate the results observed in these arguably atypical group of 
patients. 
 
Our results imply that global questions about health and HRQL should be framed more 
carefully, specifying an intended reference so as to reduce the potential ambiguities. 
Although the age-standardised comparisons have been used in surveys, we suggest that 
for patients it is more important to identify comparator groups including oneself at a 
previous time-point, healthy (similar age) peers, and patient peer-groups. 
 
In many randomised trials it may be expected that the reference frame utilisation will be 
randomly balanced across the treatment arms. Then the main consequence will be loss of 
efficiency because extra variability has been introduced by the ambiguity of reference 
frame. However, in some trials the interventions being evaluated may result in patients 
attending different clinics, and the varying experiences of patients may introduce serious 
biases. Thus in cancer trials comparing surgery against chemotherapy the patients will be 
exposed to very different clinical environments and may have differing experiences. 
 
Similarly, in studies of social interventions, comparisons could be between patients 
treated at their own home as opposed hospital inpatients. Exposure to different peer-
groups might potentially lead to serious bias. A recent Norwegian study explored the 
HRQL of palliative care patients who were randomised to comprehensive care at home as 
opposed to conventional palliative care in hospital [19]. Contrary to the investigators’ 
prior hypothesis, no difference in HRQL was observed. In light of the present findings, 
perhaps the hospital-based patients were more likely to report relatively high HRQL 
because they were exposed to other dying patients, while those at home would have been 
surrounded by healthy people and might report their HRQL correspondingly lower. Thus 
bias cannot be ruled out, and it is possible that HRQL differences were obscured. It would 
have been valuable to know the reference frames used by the patients in this clinical trial. 
 
A philosophical point about which we can only speculate is whether it is the patients’ 
perceived HRQL that changes according to reference frame, as opposed to merely their 
reported HRQL. Can perceived HRQL be “improved” by encouraging a patient to make 
downward comparisons? This is not so dissimilar from helping patients to cope and adapt 
to their illness. Thus we postulate that one possible implication of the large effects that we 
observed is that interventions might be directed towards influencing the choice of 
comparator group. Although the commonly heard admonishment to “stop feeling sorry 
for yourself, there are lots of people worse off than you are” is generally unhelpful, it is 
possible that psychotherapy could substantially alter the perception of HRQL and thereby 
improve a patient’s satisfaction and actual quality of life. We propose that clinical trials 
are needed to test such hypotheses. 
 
Despite the inherent ambiguities and uncertainties of “overall quality of life” and “general 
health”, these and similar questions provide valuable indicators of survival and of 
treatment outcome. As a consequence of the striking results of this present study, we are 
now investigating other patient groups to confirm the generality of the conclusions. 
Further studies are planned to explore whether predictions of outcome are significantly 
improved by allowance for frame of reference, and to investigate the importance of 
routinely identifying the implicit reference group when assessing HRQL outcomes in 
clinical trials. 
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